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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
I~ THE ~L_\~l,TER OF THE 
GU.A.RDIANSHIP OF CHARLES 
E. BARKER, .A.N INCOM-
PETENT,_ 
CHARLES E. BARKER, 
Respondent, 
VS. 
JOHN EDEN, 
Appellant. 
Appeal From Salt Lake County, 
Hon. Clarence E. Baker, Judge. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 20, 1932, the appellant was appointed 
guardian of the person and estate of said Charles 
E. Barker, an incompetent, C~.nd letters of guardian-
ship were issued to him on the same day. The in-
competent was 'vithout property or income, except 
a monthly allo"rance of $50.00 per month made to 
him hy the Brotherhood of Ijocomotive Firemen and 
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Engineers, for the period of his disability. These 
payments were made to the guardian, and are 
shown in his annual accountings, up to about the 
time of filing of Mr. Barker's affidavit, or petition, 
jn the present proceedings. The Brotherhood of 
~,iremen, etc., procured the examination of ~lr. 
Barker by one Dr. Arthur J. McDowell (Tr. -55), 
who pronounce! him competent to administer his 
own affairs, and upon his report to the above-
named organization, the allowance was stopped 
(Tr. 55). On April 26, 1938, ~fr. Eden filed his 
sixth and final account as guardian and petitioned 
for distribution and his discharge (Tr .. 54), and 
filed therewith the affidavit of Dr. }lcDowell stat-
ing, as above indicated, that Mr. llarker was then 
competent to manage hi~ o'vn affairs (Tr. 58). 
The last-mentioned account and petition or ~Ir. 
Eden came on for hearing on May 11, 1938, and 
thPreupon the court made the order, ( 1) that the 
account be approYed, allo"ved, and settled, ( 2) that 
the balance of the estate, viz. $386.49, be paid to 
said Charles E. Rarker, and (3) that said ,John 
Eden be diRcharged as guardian, and that his 
bondsman be discharged and exonerated. 
1."hereafter, on November 20, 1940, ~lr. Barket· 
filed an affidavit in the !fatter of the Guardian-
ship, referring to the order of the court directing 
the guardian to pay him the balance on hand, and 
stating that Mr. Eden had failed to make such pay-
Jnent, except to the amount of $50.00 .. and that he 
J1ad failed to pay or distribute the sum of $334.63: 
and on the same day he obtained an order to sho"\\" 
cause, by which said John· Eden was directed 
to appear before the court and sho'v cause 
why the balance of $334.63, together with in-
terest at the rate of 6 per cPnt per annum from 
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1Iay 23, 1938, should not be paid forthwith by hin1 
to said Charles ·E. Barker~ rro this otd.e·r to ·show 
cause, ~aid John Eden filed an ans,ver alleging 
• ·that he paid to the said Charles E. Barker on or 
about the 24th day of ~1ay, 1938, the su1n .of $386.49, 
which is all the money to ''Thich the said Charles E. 
Barker, lnco1npetent, '"as entitled. n The discrep-
ancy in the an1ounts, $386.49 and $384.63, is ex-
plained in the evidence, and is of no consequence 
here. After a hearing, lasting several days, the 
court made findings of fact and law, reciting that 
said order to sho'\\" cause was directed to said John 
Eden, ''as guardian of said incompetent,'·' and 
finding-: That on ~ray 29, 1932, said Eden, -was 
appointed guardian of the estate of said Barker 
and that he qualified as such; that p,rior to· May 23, 
1938, he filed his final report and accop.nt, upon 
\\""hich a hearing was had on May 23, 1938, follow-
ing which the court ordered said John ·Eden, as 
guardian, to pay the sum of $384 63 to said Charl~s 
E. Barker; that said John Eden ·had paid only 
$50.00 of that amount; and concluding, ~o·stensibly 
as a matter of la-,v-, that there is due and (nv-ing from 
said .John Eden to said Charles E. Barker,· the sum 
of $390.65, principal and interest. 
Pursuant to thRt decision, :a judg:nlPnt 'vas 
silgned and filed, reciting that on ·November '27, 
1940j the court made a.nd entered its order ., • re-
quiring ,John Eden, as .auardian of said incom-
petent, to appear and sho""" cause why he. should 
not forth"rith pay to ~·flid_ Charles E. BarkPl~ the 
sum of $3S4.63, tog-Pthe~ ''Tith interest at ·the rate of 
fl per .cent per annum frnrn \f Hv 2·3, 1938'' and ad-
judged aR fo11<;>~ws: "Tt iR therefore ord.ered, ··ad-
jud.ged and _rlecr0f"ld that the ahov0 named Charl0~ 
E. Barker db have and recover · judgment fr.o!n 
John Ed~n . in the total ·amount ·of $390.65, to-
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aether with court costs incurred by the said Charle.__• 
I;> 
E. Barker in prosecuting said order to show cause 
herein;'' and 
''It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that the said John Eden pay said sum togethet 
with said taxable court costs to the said Charles E. 
Barker forthwith.'' 
The evidence shows the following facts. Thal 
prior to ~iay 24, 1938, the appellant, as the guar-
dian of Charles E. BarkeT, .pursuant to the couri 's 
order settling the guardian ~s- ~'final account, ~ent 
his duly countersigned check· for $386.49 (Exhibit 
"A") to Mr. Barker in California, who indorsed 
the check and sent it hack to the appellant witl1 a 
letter (Exhibit "B ") requesting the appellant to 
take the money (and pay) his ''fees and lodge 
dues,'' and return the balance to him; that appel-
lant cashed the check, kept $336.49, and paid $50.00 
to Mr. Barker. (Tr. 89, 90, 100, 137, 144, 218-20). 
There is no evidence that the appell~nt paid an"\! 
fees or lodge dues out of the $386.49. but he aP--
counted for the $336.49 hy saying, ''I had advanced 
him money at times and paid his dues and other 
obligations he asked me io take care of, ,,.:hich l 
figured amounted to that amount." (Tr. 1.43-149). 
We shall not contend that appellant should 
not have claimed credit for such advances, if any, 
in his accounts, nor that in this resp·ect the order~ 
settling his accounts are not conclusive against 
him; neither shall we contend tha.t the accounting 
shown at pages 143-149 of the Transcript is suffi-
cient. But \ve contend that 'vhen the respondent. 
returned the che~ck to appellant with the instruc-
tions mentioned, and the latter cashed it. he held 
the proe,eeds as the agent of Mr. Barker, and not 
as his guardian. 
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ST~-i'rElVlE~'r OF ERROR-S 
That the follo\Ying is a ~tatement of the errors 
upon \Yhich the appellant relies and prays for 
a reversal of the judgment of the district court: 
1.. That that part of the third finding of facts, 
Yiz. '~the-~ t of said sun1 of $384.63, the said John 
Eden paid to the said Charles E. Barker the sum 
of $50.00 only" (Tr. 75), is not sustained by suffi-
cient evidence. 
2. That the court erred in the purported con-
clusion of lav.~ (Tr~ 75), in the following partic-
ulars: (a.) In holding, contrary to law, that the 
appellant is personally indebted to the respondent 
in the sum of $334.63~ tog-Pther 'vith interest there-
on at the rat0 of 6 per cent per annu1n from 1\{ay 
:!3, 1938; (b) in impliedly holding, contra,ry to law, 
~hat, 1n this proceeding, the respondent is entitled 
to a judgment against the appellant individually 
for the sum of $334.63, with interest as above stat-
ed; and (c) in impliedly holding·, contrary to la,v, 
that, in this proceeding, the appellant is account-
ahle and liable to the respondent for the said sum 
of $344.63, \vith interest as aforesaid, regardless of 
'\vhether be holds said sum as the guardian · or 
agent of thP rPspondent . 
. A.RG-Ul\fENT 
The particular rontentio11S of the appellant 
hayc been and are, (1) thnt he had paid over to re-
spondent the sum of $336.49 found to remain in his 
hands by the probate court's order on the settle-
nlrnt of his final account; (2) that after respond-
f'nt retnrnrd tl1Rt n1oney, or the check· representing 
it, to tl1r appPllant 'vith instructions ·to dispose of 
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~he proceeds in a certain way, that appellant held 
the check, and afterwards its proceeds, as the agent 
of the respondent; ( 3) that V\rhether the appellant 
held the money as guardian or agent, the respond-
ent's only remedy, anrl his only rnethod of recover-
ing a personal judgment, was by an ordinary ac-
tion, aR in tort for conversion, in assurnpsit as for 
money had and received, or for an equitable 
accounting, in a court of competent jurisdiction, 
and not by motion in, or on a citation issued out of, 
the probate court; and ( 4) that the p.rocedure 
adopted by the respondent in this case, viz. by a 
purported order to show cause, even if it had been 
instituted as a contempt proceeding, is not a pro-
cedure recognized in this state. We shall discuss 
these topics collectively. 
The foregoing is a judgrnent with a double 
aspect - the first part being a personal judgment 
against appellant, and the second part being an 
order against him in a. sun1mary proceeding· in the 
prohate court, which, by the way, is not provided 
hy our laws; the first supposes an action against 
~ppe1la.nt individua1lv. ·w,.hich, not"rith~tanding ex-
pressions in Weyant v. Utah Sav .. & Trust Co., 54 
Utah, 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A. JJ.. R. 1119, should be an 
~ction at la'v or in efluity, in a court of general 
jurisdiction, while the second supposes a summary 
nroceeding in the probate court against the appel-
lant a~ guardian. 
The order on th~ arcounting contains three 
elements, (1 ) approving and allowing the guar-
dian ~s account, (2Y directing that he pay over to 
Mr. BRrker the balance of the guardianship estate 
in his ha.nds, and ( 3) discharging the guardian and 
his ~urety. The rP~pondent has apparently treat-
ed the \\"hole of the order as operative, hnt dnring 
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the hearing he persistently objected tha.t the finding 
hearing he persistently ob~ected that the finding 
contained in that order, viz. "that said Charles E. 
Barker is no longer incompetent and is now capable 
of administering his own affairs,'' wa.s invalid. 
{Tr. 88, 96, 97). 
It has often hap·pened that a person has n1ade 
a claim against another as a trustee, probably ex 
maleficio, to property, even though that other got 
title to the property throug·h a fraudulent decree; 
but the claimant would not in such case attack the 
decree because it has become one of his muniments of 
title. And so, it was an anon1aly for the respond-
P.nt here, to attack the order on Mr. Eden's final 
account as invalid, and still seek to enforce the p·ro-
visions; and in C-ohen v. ~!orris, 70 Ga. 318, it was 
said: "We are aware that there are some adjudi-
~ations in other states to the effect tha.t creditors 
cannot attack an assignment as frHndu leut and 
void, and at the same tl.me claim under it and call 
on tlJe a8si~nees to accoun't to them.'' A.nd see, In 
re Evans. 42 Utah 282. 1.20 P. 217. 
In Pennington v. N e"Tman, 36 Okl. 594, 12!) l' 
693. it is said: "It seen1s to be the universal hold-
ings of the courts that neither a.n administrator, 
nor his sureties, can he ~ned on the bond until there 
has been a settlement, or an accounting, in the pro-
hate court, sho,ving a balance due, or some other 
hreach of condition~ of the bond, and a failure on 
the vart of the administrator to comply with the 
decree entererl on the ~t')tt 1 <'lTIPnt or accounting-." ·. 
In Nickals v. Stanley. 146 Cal. 724, 81 P. 117, 
the same rule is sta tecl as follo"Tf.;: '· ThP Hahi1ity 
()f the administrator arising from his dealings 'vith 
the property of the eRtnt0. cnn, during: the pendPncy 
of the a.dn1inistration ancl the lifetime~ of the ad·· 
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or ·order of the court haVing jurisdiction of the 
~state." ~1\.nd in (}reen v_ (Jaskill, 175 ~1a.ss. 2'65, 
· 56 N. E. 561, the general rule is stated as follo~·s: 
''But it is a settled principle of our law that trus-
tees appointed by the probate· court, a.s well as 
guardians, administrators, and eXf:!Cutors so 
appointed; have a right to have their accounts ad-
justed and the amounts due to or fron1 thein as 
trustees determined in the probate court, on its 
probate side, and in the u~ua1 probate proceedings; 
and that they cannot he compelled to render their 
accounts or made to pay over the funds, by proceed-
ings in equity or at law, sav~ after and in pursu-
ance of such an adjustment and determination on 
the probate side of the court.'' 
'fhe Rev. Sts. lTtah, 19::33, 102-13-11, pro·vidc-ls, 
that ''The provisions of this title relative to the 
estates of de·cedents shall, as far as conformable, 
apply also to guardianship matters.'' The provi-
sions so made applieable include Sections 102-11-36, 
, and 102-12-8. And, under the authorities, we think 
we are justified in citing cases relative to the es-
tates of deceased person~. 
The order of the probate court directing thr 
. guardian to turn over or pay to Mr. B,a.rker the 
property or money in his hands is akin to a decree 
of distribution in case of a decedent's estate. ln 
either case the order or decree entitles the dis-
tributee to demand the 1nonev or other property 
·.from the guardian or administrator, as the casr 
may he, and. in the event of the latter's failure to 
pay or deliver, the law gives the "distributee'' a 
remedy for its recovery. And this is true although 
the ,order settling the final account does not direct 
the administrator to pay over to the di-stributees 
the money in his hands; for, as hrld in In re Ken-
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nedy 's E·state, 129 Cal. 384, 44 P. 569 ; ''No spe-
cial order that the administrator p~ay over to the 
distributees is authorized or required.'' Regard-
ing a decree of distribution, it has been said, that, 
''as against the estate,, the rights of the distrib-
uitee are fully adjudicated by the decree of dis-
tribution (St. 1.lary's Hospital v. Perry, 152 Cal. 
~38, 92 P. 864); and that, "when a decree of dis-
tribution has been made, the probate court has no 
longer jurisdiction of the property distributed, and 
the distributee thenceforth has an action to recover 
j1is estate, or, in proper cases, its value." ( Sjoli v. 
Hogenson, 19 N. D. 82, 122 N. W. 1008). The san1e 
is true of a!l orde-r settling a guardian's final 
account; and in 4 Bancroft's Probate Pr. sec. 1402, 
it is said: ''As a rule the settlement of a g~uar­
rlian '.~ final account exhausts th:e power of the 
court having jurisdiction of the guardianship mat-
ter, and it has no power thereafter to re-exallnine 
and revise the account. An action to revise or set 
aside an order settling a g11ardia.n 's final account 
.is ""ithin the exclusive jurisdiction of a court of 
equity, or one exercising general equity powers, 
and a "ra.rd mu~t resort to such court if he seeks to 
falsify or surcharge an account.'' (The citation of 
Mellott v. Downing, 39 Or. 218, 64 P. 393, under 
the above statement is erroneous. It was probably 
-intended to h0 Rutterirk v. Richardson, 39 Or. 246, 
64 P. 390). See, also, ,Jackson v. Porter, 87 Okl. 
112, 209 P. 430. 
An important question in this case is that re-
lating to the remedy of the wa.rd if the guardian 
failR or refuses to turn over his property to him 
nfter a final accounting hv the guardian; assum-
i~1£-'. for the time heing-, that the guardian in this 
fl:l~P never turned oYer to the 'vard the amount re-
lnnining in his hands, this remedy, in Utah, is, "rp 
11PliPYP, n~ 11PrPinhefore stated, the Rame aR that 
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of a distributee against an administrator, in a,ccord~ 
;ance' with Rev.. Sts. ·utah, 1933, 102~13~11, which 
provides, that ''the provisions of this title relating 
to the estates of de~cedents shall, as far: as conform-
able, apply also . to_ guardianship· :rp.atters. '' ·S-ee, 
Ehrngren v. Gronlund, 19 Utah 411, 57 P. 268, 
where it is said, that und~r our statute,- the settle-
ment of the accounts of··an executor is final and 
lConclusiv~, and a decree distributing is conclusive, 
subject to a reversal or modification, and the court 
must distribute the ·amount to 'Which each person 
is entitled, and such distributees 1nay sue for the 
amounts to which they are entitled. And this is 
tr~e, according to that case, notwithstanding the 
executor or administrator has not been discharged. 
On the subje-ct of the remedies of a dist~ibutee, it 
is said in 2 Woerner, Administration ( 2d Ed.) see. 
569: 
Thus an action at law- or in equity is 
given to the legatee or distributeP aftPr 
the order to pay the legacy ·or distrioutive 
Rhare haR heen n1adP hy the nrobate court, 
by the statutes of Colorado, Delaware, 
Georgia, Illinois, Kansa.R, Kentucky, ~faine, 
M aRsa~huRettR. 1\tiiRsiR~ippi, N ehraska, N e-
·vada., Ne'v .JerRey, Ne,v York, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota. Ohio, Oklahoma, Penn..; 
sylvania., R.hode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, _Utah, Vermont, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin. 
·A direct remedy by sum1nary procesA 
in the probate eourt is given in others; in 
some of them in :1ddition tn the re1nedv bv 
action. Thus it is provided by statute i~ 
_Alabama.. Ari?;ona, Arkansas, fialifornia 
Iow·a, l\fiR~onri, New York, and perhap~ 
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other ~tate~, that, after order of distribu-
_tion and demand made upon the executor 
or administrator and failure to pa.y over, 
execution shall issue out of the probate 
court a.gainst the delinquent. 
If, as stated in 4 B-ancroft's Probate Pr., 2243, 
sec. 1388, "a guardian who fails or refuses . . . . 
to turn over the ward's property to the person en-
titled thereto, may be compelled to do so, by attach-
ment and imprisonment,'' such remedy :is, as 
appears from the notes to the above quotation, in 
consequence of special statutes, or by construction 
of f8.miliar statutes. See, Hulburd v. Com 'r In-
ternal Revenue, 296 U. S. 300, 311, 56 S. Ct. 197, 
202, 80 L. Ed. 242, 24 7, and note 6. And see, also, 
Estate of Kennedy, 129 Cal. 384, 44 P. 569~ 
The Rev. Sts. Utah, 1933, 102-12-8, relating to 
distribution, provides: •'In the order or decree the 
court must name the persons and the proportions 
or parts to which each shall be entitled, and such 
nersons may demand and sue for, in any court of 
competent ~ urisdiction, and recover their re-
~pectiYe shares from the executor or administrator 
or any person having the same in his possession.'' 
·.rhis court, in Robbins v. Duggins, 61 Utah, 542, 
216 P. 232. cites that statute, and in that connec-
tion, says: 
After distribution, an administrator 
is precluded from exercising control, as 
representatiYe, over the prop·erty distrib-
ntPd. and if assetR fully Ret a.part re1nain 
in his possesRion, he holds them as agent 
or bailee of the distributee, and not as rep-
resentative. . . . . That the administratrix 
·"TaR not forn1ally discharged but continued 
in nffi cP~ after distribution, did not prf'-· 
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·vent the distributed property from pass-
in o· beyond her jurisdiction and control. 
The fact of distribution determined the 
matter. By the decree of distribution the 
administratrix was divested of all rights to 
or control over the property distributed, 
and the title was confinned in the plain-
t iff, and thereafter he alone could .sue to 
protect or defend it. 
The action provided by the Rev. Sts. Utah, 
1933, 102-12-8, is one against the executor or ad-
ministrator individually, and not ag·ainst him in 
his representative cap~acity. . St. ~1ary 's hospital 
v. Perry, 152 Cal. 338, 92 P. 864. In that case, the 
court said: '' Wbile the court of probate m.ay, 
through the medium of contempt proceedings, com-
pel an executor or administrator to deliver to the 
distributee property distributed by the order or 
d-ecree (Ex parte Smith, 53 Cal. 204; In re Clary. 
· 112 Cal. 292, 44 P. 569; Esta.te of Kennedy, 129 Cal. 
384, 387, 62 Pac. 64) sec. 1666, Code Civ. Prac., in 
terms authorizes distributees to demand, sue for, 
and recover their respective shares from the ex· 
rcutor or administrator, or any person having the 
same in possession. Melone v. Davis, 67 Cal. 279, 
7 P. 703; Wheeler Y. Bolton, 54 Cal. 302; Le ~Ies­
na._Q'er v. Variel, 144 Cal. 463~ 77 P. 988, 103 Am. 
St. Rep. 91. Such a.n a.ction against an executor or 
a~ministrator is one against him individually, and 
not a.gainst him in his representative capacity. It. 
is not an action against the estate. As against the 
PRta.te, the rightR of the distributee are fullv ad-
judicated by the deerPe of diRtrihution ( Ree ?\.f elonP 
'V. Davis~ supra).'' The.· construction of tJ1e statute 
or statutes, that an administrator or guardian who 
fails to turn over money or other propertv to the 
perRon· Pnt.itled thereto, n1fl~'" ·hf' r.ompe1l~d to -do so 
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hy eonte1npt proceedings, never has been resorted 
to in this state. 
By anything we have ~aid in the foregoing 
argument, we do not "·ant to be understood as 
assuming that the affidavit, order to show cause, 
and citation in this proceeding were, or have been 
treated by any of the parties, as the foundation of a 
contempt proceeding to compel the guardian to pa)7 
over the money in his hands or to render another 
final account. The phra~eology of the order to 
show cause tends to sho\v· that it \vas merely the 
notice of a motion ( 42 C. J. 489, sec. 69; McAuliff.e 
v. Coughlin, 105 Cal. 268, 38 P. 730; N e.w York, etc. 
R. Co. v. New!York, 1 Hilt. (N.Y.) 562; while the 
proceedings at the hearing (Tr. 105, 113, 235-6) in-
dicate that an accounting \va.s sought, especially of 
the moneys realized on the $386.49 check after Mr. 
Barker had returned it to I.f r. Eden for certain 
purposes and cashed. Ho,vever, the judgment .(Tr. 
76) shows that Mr. Barker \Ya.s seeking a personal 
judgment for $390.65 on an order to sho"r cause in 
the probate court. 
It may appear to the court, on first considera-
tion, that the record shows that the appellant holds 
money that belongs to the respondent, and that the 
appellant's position is grounded on technicalities. 
But trial courts, and even. probate courts, should 
be held to established procedure, and that even in 
~hese latter days, when nearly everything in the 
law, substantivP or procedural, is regarded a..<; 
wrong, those courts should not be allowed to devise 
end make new process and forms of proceedings 
for every situation. 
Respectfully ~nbmitted. 
E. .A.. ROGERS~ 
Attorney ~or Appellant. 
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